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In order to avoid the merits of the issues raised, (which are clearly against him and
his wife), Ross raises summary procedural challenges, and therefore has not substantively
challenged any of the issues raised on appeal, but one, leaving the appeal for the most
part substantively unopposed.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Before addressing Ross's legal arguments, certain misrepresentations in the
Statement of the Case, and a fatal omission, must be addressed.
Ross states Barnett "appeared at the September 15, 2008 hearing." This is
misleading since he did not "appear" as that word is used as a legal term of art. This
misrepresentation is critical since the question of whether he in fact "appeared" generally,
so as to concede personal jurisdiction, is part of this appeal. He only "attended" the
September 15 th hearing as the manager of GFS. Barnett only appeared specially on
September 24, 2008, under Rule 64(e)(l) to quash the unlawful writ of execution.
REC.151-152.
Ross in discussing the September 25, 2008 Hearing states: "The trial court
affirmed its finding that the TIFRM assets were assets of GFS, not Mr. Barnett." No such
finding was made before the September 25 th hearing. Consequently no such affirmation
was made on September 25 th • The bald citations to the record give the false impression
such an affirmation was in fact made at the September 25 th hearing. But the citations are
actually to subsequent recollections of Judge Kennedy that he had made such findings.
In footnote 1, Ross misrepresents that "the assets generally encompassed TIFRM
and its intellectual property." There is no citation to the record by Ross to support this
3
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claim because it is patently false. As set forth by Barnett in his opening Brief, he is the
sole owner of the intellectual property, not TIFRM. There is no evidence anywhere in
the record that TIFRM had any intellectual property. TIFRM only had a non-exclusive,
revocable, license to market Barnett's CITRMS course. 1
Finally, the fatal omission is Ross's failure to cite to any actual "findings" in the
record that GFS owns "the TIFRM assets," and not Barnett. Barnett has repeatedly
requested Ross and the court to actually cite to the purported findings in the transcript,
but they have adamantly refused to do so, for over 8 years, and fail again to do so here:
confirming that no such findings exist. Likewise, Ross fails to cite the purported
"continuing injunction," confirming it also does not exist.

REBUTTAL
I.

Ross's failure to address the lack of jurisdiction is fatal.
By refusing to address the jurisdictional challenges made in the subject Rule 52/59

Motion in its June 21, 2017 Order, Judge Harris left in place the June 6, 2012 Order.
This was reversible error unless the court in fact had jurisdiction to enter the June 6, 2012
Order in the first place.
It would be error for this Court to affirm such orders if in fact there is no

jurisdiction, for this Court does not have any more jurisdiction than the trial court.

1

See Report of Kenneth Rushton, REC. 691-710, performed at the Request of Judge
Kennedy, finding that "the only asset of TIFRM is an agreement between Michael
Barnett and TIFRM, wherein Barnett grants TIFRM a non-exclusive, limited license to
publish and sell the intellectual property known as ... ("CITRMS").
4
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Robinson v. City Court, 185 P.2d 256,259 (Utah 1947)(appellate court jurisdiction is
derivative of trial court jurisdiction.)
This Court also has the "sua sponte obligation to carefully consider the propriety
of [its] own jurisdiction," UTA v. Local 382, 2012 UT 75, iJ26, before proceeding.
By not even discussing the jurisdictional challenges on their merits, due to his
flawed theory they were not preserved, Ross fails to meet his burden to prove this court
has any jurisdiction to affirm anything done by the trial court, and thereby concedes this
Court's lack of jurisdiction to rule in his favor.
First, Ross fatally ignores the unassailable law that:
11

A ]cquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court,
and a lack of jurisdiction can be raised by the court or either party at any time. 11
Where an appeal is not properly taken, this court lacks jurisdiction and we must
dismiss.
[

Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, iJ8 (citations omitted).
The subject matter challenges raised in this appeal unequivocally establish the trial
court lacked any subject matter jurisdiction in these supplemental proceedings to decide
who owns the assets, since Barnett as a non-party claims them, 2 and it lacks any subject
matter jurisdiction over any contempt proceedings.

2

Similarly, any attempt by the court to hold GFS somehow owned the assets based on
some plenary claim of wrongdoing by Barnett, as a non-party a, would be a clear denial
of due process:
The premise that underlay this grant of authority to execute against
property in the possession of someone other than the judgment debtor is that the
targeted property was, in fact, property belonging to the judgment debtor. Rule
69(h)( 1) recognized the possibility that the party who held the property subject to
execution might object to the execution and extended to him the right to challenge
the validity of the writ of execution. This provision was not intended, however, to
5
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Therefore, on this conceded threshold jurisdictional challenge alone, this Court is
obligated to vacate the June 2016 Order, and the June 2012 Order, and any and all other
orders or actions in these supplemental proceedings involving Barnett and/or Counsel, as
being "palpably void" for lack of jurisdiction. They are all "subsequent proceedings" of
Judge Kennedy's impermissible attempt to adjudicate ownership of the assets in
supplemental proceedings. Bott v. Bott, 43 7 P .2d 319 (Utah 1968). 3
Second, by not addressing the challenges on the merits, Ross again concedes this
Court's (and the trial court's) lack of personal jurisdiction over Barnett and Counsel by
failing to make any attempt to show that Barnett (or Counsel) in fact made a general
appearance in the underlying case so as to subject themselves to the personal jurisdiction
of the trial court or this Court, or that service was properly made in the contempt
proceedings.
Instead of addressing the personal jurisdiction issue on the merits, Ross asserts
Barnett "intervened," implying that the "intervention" was as a "party," but neither
Barnett nor Counsel have intervened as a party. The so-called "intervention" by Barnett
cited by Ross was an explicit special appearance under Rule 64(e)(l) as a third-person
claimant to challenge the invalid writ of execution. REC.151-152 that is all.
Absent actual service of a complaint naming Barnett or Counsel as a party
requiring them to appear and defend themselves, this Court is obligated to vacate all
provide an alternative form of summary adjudication of claims that would
otherwise be required to be prosecuted as civil actions.
BYU v. Tremco Consultants, 2007 UT 17, ,I45.
3
This naturally includes all purported contempt proceedings/orders and Rule 11
proceedings/orders since they are all the fruit of the same poisoned tree.
6
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orders seeking to exercise any control over Barnett and/or Counsel personally, due to the
court's lack of personal jurisdiction over them.
Absent due process, a court wields no power over an individual because a court
only acquires jurisdiction over a party through proper service of process.
BYU v. Tremco Consultants, 2007 UT 17, ,r3I.
Once again, on this conceded threshold jurisdictional ground alone, the Court is
again independently obligated to vacate every order against Appellants.

II.

Issues 2-14 are not barred.
Rather than address issues 2-14 substantively, (because Ross lacks any substantive

grounds to oppose them), Ross seeks to prevent their consideration by asserting this
Court is supposedly barred from considering them.

A.

The issues have been timely raised.
Ross first tries to argue the Issues are jurisdictionally barred because a prior appeal

was not timely initiated under Rule 4. But Ross fails to correctly identify a final,
appealable, supplemental order that Appellants supposedly were required to appeal
before now. 4
But since this is Ross's affirmative jurisdictional defense, Ross has the burden to
prove the existence of a final, appealable, supplemental order/judgment that was not
4

Barnett and Counsel have brought this appeal after the purported announcement of an
intended ruling, but before a final appealable order containing that ruling is entered, in
order to preserve their right to appeal, as is expressly allowed by appellate Rule 4(c).
Before this Court can proceed, it must first determine what is the relevant
supplemental order/judgment being appealed, and determine whether it is in fact final and
appealable, so as to finally confer all necessary appellate jurisdiction to proceed. It must
continue to wait under Rule 4(c) until a final appealable order/judgment is actually
entered.
7
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timely appealed. He has not done so. Therefore, this Court must accept that the issues
have been timely appealed (unless this Court is going to find that there is no final
appealable order entered yet and therefore it still lacks appellate jurisdiction to proceed).

1.

The March 26, 2013 partial judgment is not relevant.
Ross summarily asserts, in a single paragraph without any analytical or legal

support , that the entry of the partial final judgment between Ross and GFS on March 26,
2013 regarding the Second Cause of Action ("March 26 th Judgment") somehow precludes
this appeal of these supplemental proceedings. 5
th

The trial court and Ross, however, fail to understand the March 26 Judgment is
unrelated to when these supplemental proceedings may be appealed for two reasons:
First, Ross created dual tracks regarding the separate causes of action by seeking
to enforce the partial summary judgment on the First COA starting in 2008, and waiting
until five years later to obtain partial summary judgment on the Second COA.
Ross has never tried to enforce the March 26 th Judgment. He has only attempted
to enforce the 2008 partial judgment by means of these supplemental proceedings.
Consequently, Barnett has only appeared specially in the 2008 supplemental
proceedings, and this appeal only addresses the 2008 supplemental proceedings.
Therefore the March 26 th Judgment is totally unrelated to this appeal.
Second, any reliance on the March 26 th Judgment fails to recognize the inherent
division between underlying judgments and the supplemental proceedings to enforce

5

Judge Harris made the same error in the June 2016 Order, see paragraph 10.
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them. They have separate appellate tracks, including separate appellate deadlines,
determined independently of one another.
Ross cites Cheeves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, understanding it actually defeats his
argument.
In Cheeves, a challenge was raised to the trial court enforcing the judgment once
an appeal was taken. The Supreme Court recognized that while jurisdiction over a
judgment is transferred to the appellate courts during an appeal, the trial court
nevertheless has separate jurisdiction to enforce the judgment pending appeal. Id. at ,I48.
The Court then addressed whether it had appellate jurisdiction over the appeal of
the supplemental execution order at issue, and reasoned:

If the execution order constituted a iudgment separate and distinct from the
underlying iudgment being enforced, Williams was required to file a separate
notice of appeal to challenge that order ...
This holding is consistent with the concept that the initial action resulting in a final
judgment and the subsequent action seeking enforcement of that judgment !!I£
separate proceedings, each resulting in separate judgments that are then
individually subject to the rules of appellate procedure concerning appeals.

It therefore seems obvious that any [post-judgment] order ... is not included in
any appeal taken from the underlying order.
Id. at 1149, 52, 55. See also BYU v. Tremco Consultants, 2007 UT 17, iJ 8 n.1 ("postjudgment collections proceedings are separate and independent from the action that
yielded the judgment that the collection action seeks to satisfy.")
Consequently, Cheeves and Tremco make clear the time to appeal supplemental
proceedings is not when there is a judgment in the underlying case, as Ross claims, but
when the subject supplemental judgment/order itself is final.

9
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"Such orders are independently subiect to the test of finality~ according to their
own substance and effect."
Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah 1982).
If it were otherwise, post-judgment supplemental proceedings could never be

appealed, since a final appealable judgment presumably predates them.
Consequently, the time for GFS to appeal Ross's partial judgment against it
entered March 26, 2013, has absolutely nothing to do with the time to appeal any order in
these supplemental proceedings.
In order to argue this Court lacks jurisdiction because the time to appeal has come
and gone, Ross needed to identify a final, appealable, supplemental order/judgment
which was not timely appealed. Since he failed to do so, this challenge to the Court's
appellate jurisdiction fails.
Therefore, this Court must still decide all of the Issues 3-14 Ross mistakenly
claims were barred by the March 26 th Judgment.

2.

The Second Issue is timely appealed.
Ross summarily argues, without any legal or analytical support, that Issue 2 is

barred because the trial court refused to answer this question when it ruled on the Motion
for Clarification in its November 18, 2015 Minute Entry.
Ross fails to show how the Minute Entry was a final appealable judgment in its
own right, under the traditional tests for finality as required by Cahoon, et al.
Ross seems to assume each and every order in supplemental proceedings is to be
appealed piecemeal, regardless of its nature, by summarily arguing "Of course the time
for appeal of the November 18, 2015 Order expired December 18, 2015, ... "
10
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This assumption is contrary to Cahoon's explanation that a supplemental
postjudgment order is final where "the effect of the order ... was to determine
substantial rights ... and to terminate finally the litigation." Cahoon at 142.
The purpose of the Motion for Clarification was not to "determine substantial
rights" or to "terminate finally" the supplemental proceedings. It was simply a
procedural inquiry, leading up to the June 21, 2016 Order designed to aid Barnett in
drafting the memorandum.
Since it was only addressing the nature of the Order to be subsequently reviewed
by the Court, it obviously was not a final order resolving all issues because more action
was still anticipated by the court. See e.g. lndep. Funding v. Wynn Co., 2002 UT App
153, ifiJl-3(dismissing premature appeal of post-judgment order compelling attendance of
witnesses because it was a "preliminary matter" and not one "one that resolves the
execution of judgment entirely"); Harris v. JES Assocs., 2003 UT App 112, ,r,rs358(dismissing premature appeal of order "denying motions to quash subpoenas duces

tecum and denying objections to the scope of examination in post-judgment supplemental
proceedings").
Since the Minute Entry was only a preliminary step, it was interlocutory. It may
clearly be appealed as part of this appeal pursuant to the Merger Rule: "Once final
judgment is entered, all preceding interlocutory rulings that were "steps towards final
judgment" merge into the final judgment and become appealable at that time." Butler v.

Corp. of the President, 2014 UT 41, ,r 24 n.6.

11
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The Court does have Issue 2 properly before it, and since it is substantively
unopposed, the relief requested should be summarily granted, unless all supplemental
proceedings are vacated.

B.
The prior provisional appeals do not limit the Issues which may be raised in
this appeal.
Ross next summarily argues that issues that were or could have been raised in the
previous provisional appeals filed pursuant to Rule 4(c) cannot be raised in this appeal on
two theories: (1) resjudicata or law-of-the-case doctrine bars it, and (2) the pending Rule
60(B) appeal preempts any overlap of issues between simultaneously pending appeals. In
addition to the defects in Ross's theories, he misses the fact that both novel theories are
contingent on there being appellate jurisdiction for such appeals, which he totally fails to
address, let alone prove.

1.

Res Judicata does not bar the Issues.
Ross summarily asserts that appellants "may not raise for a second or third time

issues encompassed by their [previous provisional] appeals," Pg 35, and then cites Davis

& Sanchez v. U of U Health Care, 2015 UT 47 case for the parenthetical assertion that
"(issue may not be raised in subsequent appeals)." In the Summary of Argument, Ross
had similarly cited Macris & Assocs v. Neways, 2000 UT 93. These are, however, "res
judicata" cases, which do not help Ross's since "res judicata" only applies between two
different cases.
Res judicata and its companion, collateral estoppel, do not operate within a
single case. They are "used to describe the binding effect of a decision in a prior
case on a second case."

In re Rasmussen, 2013 UT 14, ,r,rl 7-18.
12
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The Court must therefore simply ignore these res judicata cases.

2.

The law-of-the-case doctrine does not bar the Issues.
Ross summarily "argues" in his Statement of Issues that the dismissal of the

previous provisional appeals bar this Court from addressing Issues 3-14 because they
"have been decided adverse to the Short Appellants" and therefore have not been
"preserved. " 6
Clearly none of these issues have been "decided" by any prior appeal.
So Ross instead falsely asserts: "Both of those appeals were dismissed with
prejudice," and cites the record as if the record states they were dismissed "with
prejudice." But none of the orders cited state that the appeals were dismissed "with
prejudice." They were silent on the issue. See REC. 4526-30 dismissing 2014 appeal,
REC.5210-11 denying cert, and Order dated 5/17/16, Ross Addendum at 18.
In fact, Rule 51 expressly states that orders regarding cert "shall not constitute a
decision on the merits."
Ross then baldly cites Peterson v. Armstrong, 2014 UT App 247, ifl99, with only
the parenthetical"( dismissal is on the merits unless otherwise stated by the court)." And

6

Ross fails to understand what "preservation" means: it is only that an issue has been
presented to the trial court for a decision. See e.g. Brookside v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48,
ifl4("once trial counsel has raised an issue before the trial court, and the trial court has
considered the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal.") Obviously previous appeals are
irrelevant to any proper discussion of preservation at the trial court.
13
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baldly cites two other cases without even parenthetical descriptions as to why they are
included. 7
Unfortunately for Ross, Peterson says no such thing, and is of no help to him.
Obviously, no prejudice attaches to procedural dismissals, for if prejudice attached
automatically, then an appeal could never be reinstated under Rule 23A, for the issues
would always be moot. "Thus, a dismissal of an appeal for lack of prosecution does not,
by itself, constitute an adjudication on the merits." State v.Clark, 913 P.2d 360, 362
(Utah App 1996).
Therefore Ross not only has not presented any law or analysis to support his novel
theory, the law he does cite directly contradicts him.

It appears that Ross is feebly trying to make a law of the case argument since Ross
in his Statement of Issues baldly cites IHC v. D&K Mngt, 2008 UT 73, ,I26, after
summarily stating "Decisions through April 10 2015 were decided adverse to the Short
Appellants by the dismissal of [the appeals]." 8

7

The additional cases are never even discussed and applied to this case, as required by
Rule 24, and therefore should be ignored. Without waiving, Barnett notes they are
criminal res judicata cases, not law of the case doctrine in civil case. The Court's actual
holding in State v. Clark is that defendant was "barred under the doctrine of res iudicata
from subsequently challenging his sentence on the same legal basis. Thus we dismiss
defendant's second appeal." Given the narrow topic, and the fact that the Court was
discussing res judicata and not law of the case, Clark should not be applied in this case,
for to do so would be an expansion into unknown territory. There is already plenty of
existing "law of the case" precedent involving appeals, and their impact in a given case.
Furthermore, the analysis is obviously flawed.
8
Ross also cites Robinson v Robinson, 2016 UT App 32, ,I25-26, without any analysis,
Ross' s reliance is misguided, because in Robinson the question was whether a factual
finding in a divorce case which was not challenged in a prior appeal (that was actually
heard) constituted the law of the case before the trial court, which had continuing
14
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But paragraph 26 of IHC does not help Ross because it simply states the general
law of the case doctrine, which is that "' a decision made on an issue during one stage of
a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.'"
Obviously the dismissals of the prior appeals, without any discussion of the issues
raised therein, do not constitute "a decision made on an issue," and therefore cannot
constitute the law of the case.
The Supreme Court recently rejected a similarly misguided attempt when there
was no actual decision in a prior appeal.
"Of course in order for the law of the case doctrine to apply at all, this
court must have actually decided the issue in a prior opinion. [Plaintiff]
contends that we resolved the election of remedies issue in our previous opinion in
this case, and that we should remain true to our prior decision. In our prior
opinion, this court never so much as mentioned the election of remedies doctrine,
much less decided the issue. . ..
Our silence on the election of remedies issue in our prior opinion was just
that-silence .....
We conclude that the law of the case doctrine does not apply because we
did not resolve the election of remedies issue in our prior opinion.
Helf v. Chevron, 2015 UT 81, ifif65-67.

In any event, Ross misconstrues the entire concept of the law of the case doctrine
as being an absolute bar to reconsideration, when it is not.
The law of the case doctrine is not a limit on judicial power, but only a
practice .... "The doctrine is not an inexorable command that rigidly binds a
court to its former decisions but rather is an expression of good sense and wise
judicial practice." Among situations where reconsideration of a previously
decided issue is recognized as desirable, notwithstanding the law of the case, is
when there is a "need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest iniustice."
iurisdiction. There is no discussion or holding in Robinson even remotely on point with
Ross' theory.
15
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Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 439 (Utah 1993)(citations omitted).
Therefore, even if the dismissed appeals constituted the law of the case, it does not
prevent this Court from reconsidering any issues that could have been raised during the
previous appeals, because it is free to "correct a clear error or prevent a manifest error,"
such as:
(1)

allowing a case to continue when there is no subject matter or personal

jurisdiction;
(2)

threatening and sanctioning a non-party for not complying with a "continuing

injunction" that does not even exist;
(3)

relying on a judge's personal recollection when the record unequivocally proves

those recollections flawed, especially when he was presented the opportunity to review
the record and refused;
(4)

seizing non-parties' assets without any evidence they were owned by the judgment

debtor;
(5)

Counsel reinforcing the trial court's false memories rather than complying with his

Rule 3.3 duty of candor to admit there is no continuing injunction or findings, and
refusing to admit there is absolutely no evidence of ownership by GFS;
(6)

sanctioning counsel on your last day in office for correctly challenging protracted

judicial misconduct without showing how 20 plus papers lacked any legal or factual
merit;
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(7)

refusing as a successor judge to perform his duty to correct the litany of clear

errors and manifest injustice caused by his predecessor. 9
And so on and so on.
The clear errors and manifest injustices in this case are overwhelming, and trump
any fabricated law-of-the-case argument attempted by Ross in order to try protect the
house of cards he has built.
Since Ross fails to provide any actual law (or analysis) to support his novel
arguments, this defective argument should be summarily rejected by the Court, and it
should proceed to address Issues 3-14.

3.

The pending appeal of the Rule 60(b) rulings does not "preempt" the Issues.
Ross next unsupported claim is: "It is apparent that the earlier, 2015, appeal covers

nearly all of the issues set out in the later, 2016 appeal. The later appeal is therefore
preempted as to all issues but Issue I, and should be dismissed." Pg.36
But once again Ross does so without any legal or analytical support, and therefore
his novel conclusion should be rejected.

It is also flawed in that appeals of Rule 60(b) denials (like supplemental
proceedings) are on a different track than direct appeals of a true "judgment."

9

Judge Harris plainly erred when he stated that he was declining to exercise his discretion
to undertake reconsideration of Judge Kennedy's actions, see fn 1 of June 21, 2016
Order, without first determining if Judge Kennedy's actions were clearly erroneous or
were causing manifest injustice.
In situations like the one before us, a judge who recognizes a mistake by the judge
previously concerned with the same case and yet fails to correct that mistake
simply delays the inevitable correction at the appellate level.
Gillmor at 440.
17
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In Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d 878, 880-81 (Utah App 1988), the question
was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 60(b) motion once the
notice of appeal had been filed. The Court held that even though jurisdiction over the
judgment had been passed to the appellate courts, the trial court still had jurisdiction to
entertain a Rule 60(B) motion because they are on separate tracks Gust like Cheeves

supra). Then it held:
"We further hold that if the district court finds the [Rule 60(b)] motion to be
without merit, it may enter an order denying the motion, and the parties may appeal

from that order." Id.
Consequently, jurisdiction over the underlying judgment may be transferred to the
appellate courts, and then the trial court's separate Rule 60(b) jurisdiction may also be
transferred to the appellate courts: And dual appeals may exist in a given case.
There simply is no legal basis for holding that common issues cannot be raised in
both appeal tracks.
Naturally jurisdictional challenges may/must be raised in both appeals since the
appellate courts cannot exercise jurisdiction it does not have to affirm either a Rule 60(b)
denial or a direct judgment.
Similarly, if a trial court has a false perception of duty, that mistake may appear in
both appeals, although perhaps for different reasons, as in this case.
Likewise, when the foundation of both the underlying judgment and the Rule
60(b) denial are based on errors regarding of the record, the false perception must be
challenged in both appeals.
18
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And if there really is no final appealable judgment, then no Rule 60(b) motion
regarding a final judgment is even possible, and therefore in both cases the final
judgment rule precludes appellate jurisdiction for the same reason.
There simply is no law or logic presented that justifies this Court holding for the
first time ever that a Rule 60(b) appeal preempts a subsequent direct appeal as to any
overlapping issues. Therefore Ross's flawed theory should once again be rejected and
Issues 3-14 addressed unopposed.

4.
The Prior appeals cannot possibly limit this appeal unless this Court had full
appellate jurisdiction to consider the previous appeals on the merits.
Ross' s novel arguments that the prior provisional appeals limit this appeal begs the
question as to whether this Court had any appellate jurisdiction over the prior appeals.
For if it did not, then nothing could have happened in the prior appeals to adversely affect
this appeal because any proceeding in the prior appeals were null and void ab initio.
Consequently, before this Court may even consider Ross's novel arguments
regarding the prior appeals, it must first affirmatively find that it in fact had full appellate
jurisdiction over each of the prior appeals by expressly identifying the specific final
appealable supplemental judgment/order it claims gave it appellate jurisdiction in each
appeal and then "independently subiect [it) to the test of finality," as explicitly
required by Cahoon.
For if there was no final appealable supplemental judgment/order, no jurisdiction
was ever passed to this Court.
Our rules of civil and appellate procedure provide a set of mandatory, and
jurisdictional, prerequisites that must be met before jurisdiction transfers from the
19

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

district court to the appellate court. Where a party fails to comply with the rules,
jurisdiction remains with the district court.
Garverif7.
The same jurisdictional analysis must be done for the court's prior subject matter
and personal jurisdiction.
And if no jurisdiction was ever passed it is as if the appeals never happened.
Therefore Issues 3-14 must be heard unless this Court reviews its past actions for
jurisdiction.

III. ISSUE II: The trial court erred in refusing to address the merits of the
Subject Motion on its flawed sua sponte theory.
In the sole issue addressed by Ross on the merits, Ross misrepresents the trial
court's ruling, misconstrues legal conclusions as factual, 10 and presents arguments which
lack any legal or analytical support.

A.

Judge Harris did not reject the Motion because it was "moot."
Ross claims Judge Harris denied the motion because intervening decisions of both

the trial court and appellate court "rendered the Motion moot."
Ross fails to pinpoint cite to the Record where the trial court actually held the
Motion was "moot." No doubt because the trial court never actually held the Motion was
"moot."

10

While Ross asserts Appellants have failed to marshal the evidence supporting Judge
Harris' "finding" of "staleness" in its Rule 24 complaints, Ross then fails to actually
include that argument in seeking to uphold the trial court's actions. But the primary
challenge is not the validity of "facts," although several have defects, the challenge is to
Judge Harris' legal conclusion that he could simply refuse to entertain the Motion
because he considered it was too "stale."
20
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There is a significant legal difference between a motion being "moot," which
means the relief requested cannot be granted, and a motion being "stale," which has no
legal precedent, and is not allowed.

B.
There is no legal authority granting Judge Harris the option of not deciding
the Motion on the merits.
Ross next mistakenly argues once again that the prior appeals somehow "decided"
the issues raised in the Motion. But this defective argument was never raised below, and
is not part of Judge Harris' ruling. Therefore it cannot be a basis for affirming his
decision to not make a decision.
Consequently, Ross has not provided any substantive law permitting what Judge
Harris did.
Remand would therefore be appropriate as requested to require Judge Harris to do
his duty in cleaning up Judge Kennedy's clear errors and manifest injustices in the first
instance, rather than allowing him to dump the job in this Court's lap.
This Court should make it clear in this case, and all similar cases where there is a
successor judge, that the successor judge is fully responsible for correcting clear errors
and manifest injustice, etc., committed by their predecessors, rather than expect this
Court to do it for them.

C.
Judge Harris abandoned his role as a neutral arbiter by raising the
"staleness" theory sua sponte.
Ross then challenges appellants' claims that Judge Harris acted sua sponte by
arguing that appellants in fact had actual "notice" that such grounds were before him.

21
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Ross does so by what can only be considered a deliberate misrepresentation of the
Record.
Nowhere on the pages cited did Ross ever "point[] out that argument of Motion
had already been made and rejected by the trial court and too much time had passed to
reconsider." This is a fabrication of a record that simply does not exist.
Ross addressed issues such as whether Judge Kennedy considered Barnett's
objections to the proposed order, REC.8723-24. Whether the Motion was a permissible
attempt to relitigate the September proceedings, REC.8724-25. Whether the court could
do anything once a third party "intervenes," REC.8725. And whether the Court had
jurisdiction, REC.8726.
But nowhere in Ross' s opposition is there any "staleness" argument presented.
The inescapable fact is that Judge Harris came up with the "staleness" theory all
on his own, researched the record, and then adopted it. All without giving notice to
Barnett that he intended to consider doing so, which prevented Barnett from being heard
on his novel theory before he adopted it. Judge Harris became Ross' s advocate.
Judge Harris thereby denied Barnett due process by denying him adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard before a fair tribunal. Which rendered the June 21, 2016
Order void, and requires remand with instruction to entertain and decide the Motion on
the merits.

IV.

Ross's Rule 24 objections
Ross improperly attempts to use his opposition brief as a motion to dismiss the

appeal, based on technicalities rather than substance.
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But there is no grant of authority in Rule 24 to summarily dismiss an appeal for
failing to comply as requested by Ross. And not a single one of the cases he cites
actually dismissed an appeal simply because Rule 24 was not followed. So Ross's
summary request for dismissal lacks any legal support.
Furthermore, the proper procedure for disregarding or striking a brief is by filing a
motion, not by arguing for it in an opposing brief.
Rule 24(k) provides: "Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court .... "
Barnett/Ross will therefore respond to the Rule 24 arguments consistent with Rule
24(k) by treating Ross' arguments as a motion, and responding separately thereto.
But in the spirit of compliance, and to better assist the court, appellants will take
the corrective action anticipated by Rule 27(e) for the technical violations alleged, 11 and
file an Addendum within 5 days which will include a copy of the June 21, 2016 Order, a
Summary of Argument, and amended Statement of Issues, Nature of Case, and
Determinative Provisions.

V.

Ross's Request for Sanctions

A.

The Court lacks jurisdiction to award any sanctions.
As a preliminary matter, before the Court can even consider awarding any attorney

fees to Ross, it must first determine if it even has any jurisdiction over this case, for if it

11

The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 24 provides: "Briefs that do not comply with
the technical requirements of this rule are subject to Rule 27(e)." Which Rule merely
requires the clerk to return a non-compliant brief for correction within 5 days.
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lacks jurisdiction all of its proceedings are "palpably null and void," Bott, supra, and all it
may do is dismiss the case.
"Because we lack jurisdiction, we may not address the Employees' request for
attorney fees on appeal." Ashton v. Learnframe, Inc., 2008 UT App 172, P 12 n.3.

Ashton v. Learnframe, Inc., 2009 UT App 172 n.2
Therefore the Court must affirmatively find that it has subject matter jurisdiction
over these supplemental and contempt proceedings, and personal jurisdiction, and
appellate jurisdiction before even considering awarding sanctions.
And of course if the Court is persuaded by Ross' s argument that the Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear Issues 3-14, then it logically follows it also lacks jurisdiction to award
sanctions for raising Issues 3-14. It is a catch 22 the Court cannot escape.
B. Ross's request is too haphazard to be addressed in this brief.
Ross in a haphazard, shotgun approach simultaneously seeks costs and fees under
Rule 24(k), 33, and 40, jumping back and forth between the Rules in a disjointed manner,
without articulating the appropriate elements and standards for each Rule or presenting a
coherent recitation of the alleged facts related to that specific Rule, with mandatory
citations to the Record. Ross only baldly cites two cases, and does not provide any legal
support or analysis of the applicable case law regarding each Rule, and thereby fails to
address standards Ross does not even acknowledge exists.
For example, this court has held that Rule 33 sanctions may only be applied in
"egregious" cases so as to avoid chilling the right to appeal erroneous lower court rulings,

see Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App 1989); LD lllv. BBRD, 2009 UT
App 301, ,r21. And that "an unsuccessful appeal which is worthy of consideration is not
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an egregious case worthy of sanctions and, therefore is not frivolous." Munns, v. Munns,
790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah App 1990).
Ross has failed to apply these specific standards to the specific facts of this appeal.
In other words, Ross himself ironically fails to comply with Rule 24 in his request
for sanctions thereunder.
Ross's argument amounts to nothing more that summary, ultimate conclusions,
many of which are based on the actual misconduct of the trial court which is being
appealed, as if the trial court is infallible. For example, Ross faults appellants for
"asserting factual claims that have been rejected by the trial court," (without bothering to
tell this Court what facts he is referring to). Of course Appellants are asserting facts that
have been rejected by the trial court, because they are asserting that the trial court erred in
rejecting those facts. That is the purpose of an appeal. 12
He also summarily claims that appellants have not offered any cogent arguments
for their positions, even though Ross fails to address any of the positions to show how
they are not cogent, or contrary to governing law, and even though they are quite cogent
to those who understand the applicable law.

12

Once again, Ross's counsel is careful to not say the facts are not true, because he
knows they are true, but he continues to breach his duty of candor to admit that he
repeatedly made such factual misstatements to Judge Kennedy. If the continuing
injunction was in fact imposed in September 2008, as Ross has persistently claimed, then
where is Ross' s citation to the Record in compliance with Rule 24? If the findings that
GFS owned the assets and not Ross were made on September 25, 2008, as Ross has
reputedly claimed, then where is his citation to the record? There are no citations
because the facts don't exist, and Ross's counsel knows it, but will not be candid with
this Court.
25
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Ross even makes knowing misrepresentations, such as asserting that appellants
"conceded that the [previous provisional] appeals never should have been filed, but only
in the face of motions from Ross." In fact, in each Notice of Appeal and the docketing
statements appellants made it perfectly clear they were filing a provisional appeal.
And so on and so on.
This scattered shotgun approach, without any reasoned analysis or legal support,
based on general assertions of fact and misrepresentation, was repeatedly used by Ross' s
counsel below. In fact it was the tactic he used in filing not one omnibus Rule 11 motion,
but two simultaneous motions for sanctions, both seeking overlapping sanctions for
approximately 20 papers filed by Counsel, REC.4677-4695 and REC.4778-4797, wherein
he made summary conclusions that all of the papers lacked any factual support without
even identifying the factual representations at issue or showing how they were false. And
he asserted that all of the papers lacked any legal support without identifying the legal
positions taken therein or providing any law contrary to the law provided. 13

13

Some of these papers included the same jurisdictional challenges raised in this appeal,
with the same case law cited in appellants' briefs. Which shows that the papers did in
fact have legal support. Judge Kennedy then summarily found based on Ross' s boiler
plate motions that all of the papers lacked any legal support, also without identifying any
actual legal position or setting forth any law contrary thereto, or any factual basis,
without identifying which facts he held were false. REC.5170-5174. And yet Ross tries
to hold up this obviously defective ruling as proof that Barnett and Counsel are acting
improperly in bringing this appeal to challenge it an similar misconduct. Ross's former
counsel and Judge Toomey made the same mistakes in regards to Ross's first boilerplate
omnibus Rule 11 Motion Rec. IO 11-1048. Rec. I 266. Barnett and Counsel are simply
seeking the relief they are entitled to after years of misconduct by Judge Kennedy and
Ross' s counsel. That is the natural purpose of an appeal.
26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Since such scattered allegations are more suited to a motion, and in fact are
required to be by motion as far as any violation of Rule 24 is concerned, and since
adequately addressing the numerous misrepresentations and flawed assumptions and
conclusion requires substantial work and needlessly increases the costs of litigation for
appellants, responding is far beyond the scope of this limited brief. It is therefore
requested that if the Court finds any possible merit to any of Ross's grounds for sanctions
that it provide appellants with notice as to which alleged grounds cause it concern and
allow appellants to then address those specific grounds by formally briefing them.
That way appellants will have the notice required as a matter of due process as to
what claims the court is actually going to consider, and a meaningful opportunity to
prepare an opposition thereto, and have a meaningful opportunity to be heard thereon.
REQUEST FOR HEARING
In any event, appellants expressly request a hearing on any claim under Rule 33 or
40 as expressly required by Rule 33(c)(3) and Rule 40(b).
CONCLUSION
Before the Court considers any other issues, it must consider Appellants'
jurisdictional challenges, for if they are correct, the Court must vacate all supplemental
and contempt proceedings. This will moot the other issues.
If the Court does not agree with Appellants jurisdictional challenges, it must next

consider Ross' s novel jurisdictional challenges, but inasmuch as Ross' s novel arguments
as to why this Court may not address Issues 2-14 lack any legal or analytical support,
they must be rejected, and Issues 2-14 must be heard.
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..

Since Ross fails to oppose Issues 2-14 on the merits, the appeals should be granted
as unopposed, and the relief granted accordingly.
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